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WORD MEANING AND LEXICAL PRAGMATICS*
károly bibok
In spite of their differences, Two-level Conceptual Semantics, Generative Lexicon The-
ory and Relevance Theory also have similarities with respect to treatment of the rela-
tion of word meanings and contexts. Therefore, the three theories can be considered
as complementing each other in analysing word meanings in utterances. In the present
paper I will outline a conception of lexical pragmatics which critically amalgamates
the views of these theories and has more explanatory power than each theory does
separately. Such a lexical pragmatic conception accepts lexical-semantic representa-
tions which can be radically underspecified and allow for other methods of meaning
description than componential analysis. As words have underspecified meaning rep-
resentations, they reach their full meanings in corresponding contexts (immediate or
extended) through considerable pragmatic inference. The Cognitive Principle of Rel-
evance regulates the way in which the utterance meaning is construed.
1. Introduction
Relations between word meanings and concepts seem to be a timeless
problem of lexical semantics. According to holistic cognitive linguistics,
word meanings are connected to our world knowledge so tightly that it
does not make any sense to talk about linguistic(ally encoded) mean-
ing (cf. Kiefer 1995). At the same time “the concept it [i.e., a word] is
used to convey in a given utterance has to be contextually worked out”
(Sperber–Wilson 1998, 185). In Relevance Theory initiated by Sperber
and Wilson (1995) a hearer interprets an utterance after decoding it by
means of inferences in accordance with the principle of communicative
relevance. The role of contexts in the construction of full-fledged ut-
terance meanings is also acknowledged by Generative Lexicon Theory
(Pustejovsky 1995; 1998) as well as by Two-level Conceptual Semantics
(Bierwisch 1979; 1983b; 1996). Although the latter theories take as their
starting-point the assumption that in the lexicon words generally encode
concepts which are not fully determined, this idea is not unknown for
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Relevance Theory. Sperber and Wilson (1998, 185) indicate that words
of this type are rather common. Furthermore, in contrast to Generative
Lexicon Theory, Two-level Conceptual Semantics distinguishes between
linguistic and conceptual meanings. While it considers linguistic meaning
to be underspecified, it derives the conceptual meaning from the interac-
tion of linguistic meaning with our world knowledge induced by contexts.
However, in spite of these differences, the three theories — because of
their similarities with respect to the treatment of the relation of word
meanings and contexts—can be considered as complementing each other
in analysing word meanings. Moreover, using these three conceptions
together seems to be a promising venture since, in the light of the new
discipline of lexical pragmatics (Németh T.–Bibok 2001a), research into
word meanings should pay special attention to the necessary interaction
of lexicon and contexts.
The present paper aims at setting forth in detail such a lexical prag-
matic conception of word meaning that relies upon as its starting-point
the types of representation familiar to Two-level Conceptual Semantics,
Generative Lexicon Theory and Relevance Theory (henceforth: TCS,
GLT and RT, respectively) and amalgamates the interpretation mecha-
nisms originating from these theories. This is the best way that their
advantages can be exploited in the field of mutual effects between lexical
meanings and contexts.
Lexical pragmatics, proposed in this study, takes for granted the
following five assumptions.
First, it allows for the underspecified representation of lexical mean-
ings.
Second, it conceives of contexts in a broad sense ranging from the
purely linguistic contexts (e.g., government structures) to verbal and non-
verbal ones containing world knowledge.
Third, unlike in Grice (1975) and in neo-Gricean pragmatics (e.g.,
Levinson 2000), inferential processes are considered necessary not only
to establish (conversational) implicatures via the Co-operative Principle
and its maxims. Constructing propositions expressed by utterances also
requires the execution of some inferences, because—as post-Gricean RT
propagates—the linguistically encoded information is not sufficient for
that. Thus, the distinction between semantics and pragmatics is not cor-
related with the distinction of propositional meaning and implicatures.
Rather the research into semantic and pragmatic meanings can be sepa-
rated alongside with decoding and inference (cf. Carston 2002, 95).
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Fourth, lexical pragmatics follows RT in this respect with a differ-
ence. Relevance-theoretic pragmatics does not postulate a pragmatic
competence, but decoding and inference are two types of cognitive perfor-
mance, i.e., of real-time, on-line processing (for more on this, see Carston
2002, 10–1). At the same time, interpretation mechanisms of TCS and
generative devices of GLT are proposed as rules of theories about lin-
guistic competence. However, I conceive of inferential, interpretative and
generative devices in a way neutral in regard to the distinction of com-
petence and performance. To refer to these meaning derivation tools in
such a way, I will speak about constructing, or construing, word and
utterance meanings which takes place in contexts and has underspec-
ified meaning representations as its starting-point. In doing so, I am
encouraged by the parallel architecture of grammar (Jackendoff 2002),
according to which grammar contains several sets of formation rules (the
“generative” components: phonology, syntax and semantics), each deter-
mining its own characteristic type of structure, and the structures are
linked by interface components. In comparison with the syntax-centred
framework, parallel architecture permits a much closer relation between
competence and performance, because it lends itself quite naturally to
addressing processing issues (for details see Jackendoff 2002, ch. 7).
Fifth, the expression constructing, or construing, word and utterance
meanings is intended as a neutral phrase in another respect, namely in
that of distinction of interpretation and generation. One of the motiva-
tions for creating the parallel architecture of grammar was the specificity
of semantic combinatorial rules, which TCS also admitted and even defi-
nitely stressed independently of the fact that Bierwisch originally thought
of his semantics as an addition to a syntax-centred framework. Further-
more, if one also takes into account that—as has just been seen—parallel
architecture makes it possible to connect competence and performance,
one should not feel uneasy about real-time processes, whether utterance
understanding or utterance production. (RT attempts to capture both
sides of communication but it seems to prefer to deal with comprehen-
sion processes.)1
1 Keeping in mind the clarifications concerning distinctions of competence and
performance as well as interpretation and generation, I will not terminologically
rephrase the ideas of TCS, GLT and RT into the above mentioned neutral ex-
pression. I will only use the new terminology with caution in the present article
when this seems to be unavoidable.
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The structure of the present paper mirrors the train of thought ac-
cording to which — in developing lexical pragmatics — one may exploit
TCS and GLT (initiated originally not as pragmatic theories by Bierwisch
and Pustejovsky), as well as RT playing a significant role in current prag-
matics. That is why sections 2–4 investigate these theories one by one,
returning again and again to questions of lexical representation and con-
structing word and utterance meanings in contexts. In progression from
section 2 to section 4, I will show how TCS, GLT and RT complement
each other and can be assembled together in the framework of lexical
pragmatics, which has more explanative power than each theory does by
itself. Each section deals with the analyses and methods proposed by the
theories only to the necessary degree, and it emphasizes desirable mod-
ifications and changes for the sake of more precise and comprehensive
solutions.2 The paper ends with conclusions (section 5).
2. TCS and lexical pragmatics
During the elaboration of lexical pragmatics one has to take into ac-
count from TCS the methods of representation of lexically encoded but
underspecified meanings and the operations of contextual interpretation.
Word meanings in the lexicon are often not fully specified. The under-
specified meaning is concretized by our world knowledge, activated in
neutral, i.e., non-metaphorical contexts. Thus, one gets literal meanings
of a word from which metaphorical meanings can emerge in non-neutral
contexts (Bierwisch 1979, 141–3). Before I turn to the mechanisms of
contextual interpretation in TCS, two remarks are in order. First, as has
already been indicated in section 1, TCS distinguishes between knowledge
of language and world knowledge and, consequently, between two levels of
meaning representation: that of linguistic (semantic) meaning and that
of conceptual meaning. The context-free, underdetermined meaning (also
called core meaning) belongs to the former, the literal and metaphorical
meanings (both involving world knowledge, i.e., being context-bound) to
the latter. Second, the metaphorical meaning is hardly studied in TCS.
Therefore, the conceptual interpretation in TCS actually amounts to the
2 As my several earlier papers were written in the framework of TCS, the structure
of the section about it is somewhat different from that of sections 3 and 4.
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operations that result in literal meanings occurring in neutral contexts,
i.e., conceptual shift, differentiation and selection.3
The derivation of a literal meaning of a word can be done by concep-
tual shift, when the underspecified lexical meaning gets fully determined
senses in various conceptual fields, or by conceptual differentiation, when
the core meaning is concretized in somewhat different ways but in one and
the same conceptual domain. In utterances the selection and combina-
tion of literal meanings produced by conceptual shift and differentiation
is regulated by the third operation of contextual interpretation mentioned
above, namely by conceptual selection. Consider (1).
(a)(1) 1975-ben Péter elment az iskolából.
1975.ine4 Péter.nom left.indef.3sg the school.ela
‘In 1975 Péter left school.’
(b) Délelőtt tíz órakor Péter elment az iskolából.
morning ten o’clock.tem Péter.nom left.indef.3sg the school.ela
‘At ten o’clock in the morning Péter left the school.’
In the context of the time adverbial in (1a), the noun iskola ‘school’ most
likely refers to an institution, and in (1b) it can be typically interpreted
as a building. These two different meanings of iskola ‘school’ derive from
an underspecified meaning given in (2).
(a)(2) ‘x has the goal to provide for teaching/learning processes’,
(b) λx[x goal w], where w = teaching/learning processes.
(2a) and (2b) are equivalent to each other, but the latter formalizes
the underspecified meaning of iskola ‘school’ in the language of lambda-
calculus (for details see Bierwisch 1983b; 1996). As a matter of fact,
it should be clear that one has to introduce a variable of level into the
description of the core meaning of iskola ‘school’ and, accordingly, to
specify it to separate the noun iskola ‘school’ from egyetem ‘university’,
főiskola ‘college’ etc. However, (2) is sufficient for the present purposes.
3 I will turn to the issue of metaphors in section 4.
4 The abbreviations used in the glosses throughout this paper are the following:
3sg = third person singular, abl = ablative, acc = accusative, all = allative, def =
definite conjugation, del = delative, ela = elative, ill = illative, ine = inessive,
indef = indefinite conjugation, ins = instrumental, nom = nominative, poss =
possessive inflexion (of third person singular), sub = sublative, sup = superessive,
tem = temporal.
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The literal meanings of iskola ‘school’ in (1a) and (1b) can be derived
through conceptual shift by means of the concretizing variable x as an
institution and as a building, respectively.
It is obvious that this way of the treatment of polysemy is distinct
from the solution of classical lexicology and lexicography, according to
which the secondary meaning is derived from a fully specified primary
meaning on the basis of a metonymical relation between them. Before
enumerating reasons arguing in favour of the new conception of poly-
semy, a remark is necessary. The meanings ‘institution’ and ‘building’
of various school -type nouns5 are shown differently in the dictionaries of
Hungarian. In Bárczi–Országh (1959–1962) these meanings figure as a
separate meaning and its variant in the entry iskola ‘school’, two separate
meanings in the entry egyetem ‘university’, they are combined into one
meaning in the entry kórház ‘hospital’, and not dissociated at all in the
entry főiskola ‘college’. In Pusztai (2003) one finds a separate meaning
and its variant in the entries iskola ‘school’ and egyetem ‘university’ but
the ‘building’ meaning is not indicated in the entries főiskola ‘college’ and
kórház ‘hospital’. Even if we disregard such lexicographic inconsistencies,
the explanation of polysemy of school -type nouns via conceptual shift is
more adequate for the following reasons (cf. Bierwisch 1983b):
(a) neither the ‘institution’ meaning nor the ‘building’ meaning seems
to be “more literal” than the other,
(b) the problem of the selection of a primary meaning, which could often
be solved only in an arbitrary way, does not emerge,6
(c) the failure of alternation of ‘institution’ and ‘building’ systemati-
cally explains the specificity of the nouns kormány ‘government’ and
5 These are the nouns which have a similar but not the same set of meanings as
the noun iskola ‘school’ does. They are the following:
középiskola ‘secondary school’, egyetem ‘university’, főiskola ‘college’, in-
tézet ‘institute’, akadémia ‘academy’, múzeum ‘museum’, színház ‘theatre’,
opera ‘opera house’, mozi ‘cinema’, parlament ‘parliament’, kormány ‘gov-
ernment’, palota ‘palace’, minisztérium ‘ministry’, bank ‘bank’, tőzsde ‘stock
exchange’, bíróság ‘court of justice’, kórház ‘hospital’, élelmiszer-áruház ‘su-
permarket’ etc.
6 Taylor (1994) and Kiefer (2000, 129–38)—the latter in the framework of TCS—
take as a starting-point the metonymical relationship between ‘institution’ and
‘building’ meanings of such a noun as iskola ‘school’. I will return to their
standpoint after discussing the forms of lexical-semantic representations in GLT
(see 3.4).
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palota ‘palace’, i.e., the alternation in question is blocked if either
conceptual unit is lexicalized in a lexical entry.
It can be seen from (c) that there is not a sharp distinction between
the two types of meaning, i.e., linguistic and conceptual meanings. The
reference to institution or building can either depend on the context (cf.
iskola ‘school’) or be fixed on the lexical-semantic level (cf. kormány
‘government’ or palota ‘palace’).
However, in my earlier work (Bibok 1999; 2000) I proposed an impor-
tant modification of Bierwisch’s conceptual shift. The literal meanings,
directly and indirectly derived from the underspecified meaning, have to
be distinguished. The first type of literal meanings is called primary,
the second one non-primary. The distinction at stake is unavoidable be-
cause—in contrast to Bierwisch’s original proposal—not all the literal
meanings of nouns iskola ‘school’, könyv ‘book’ etc. can be immediately
derived from underspecified cores. To put it the other way around, stating
that all the resulting meanings are literal does not mean that they are un-
structured. In fact, they might have a complex internal structure. Let us
consider the example iskola ‘school’ once more. Its primary literal mean-
ings (‘institution’ and ‘building’) can be directly derived from the under-
specified meaning. Nonetheless, its non-primary literal meanings cannot
derive from such a core, but they appear by way of the derivation from
specific primary meanings, similarly to the forming of non-basic meanings
in traditional lexicology and lexicography. Surely the non-primary mean-
ings ‘type of institution’ and ‘ensemble of people’ (cf. English expressions
like the school as one of the most important inventions of human civi-
lization and the school going for a trip) are attached to conceptual units
‘institution’ and/or ‘building’. Furthermore, the non-primary meaning
‘activities’ (cf. the school annoying somebody) has to be added to the
conceptual unit ‘ensemble of people’. Despite the structured character
of literal meanings, they all remain literal in the sense that they figure
in neutral contexts, i.e., in contexts which do not require the deletion or
re-interpretation of previously established meaning components, which is
necessary in the case of metaphorical meanings.
Like the noun iskola ‘school’, the verb elmegy ‘leave’ in (1) can also
be interpreted in two ways: as a change in affiliation in (1a) and as a
change of place in (1b). The corresponding literal meanings of this verb
are derived from an underspecified meaning by conceptual differentiation.
The representation of the latter meaning contains the abstract compo-
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nent move, which indicates no change in physical or social space, as well
as a condition concerning move (formally speaking: a predicate vari-
able bound by an existential quantifier). This variable is concretized in
corresponding contexts as a change of physical or social place.7
As for conceptual differentiation in general, it has to be stressed that
I also modified Bierwisch’s original version of it in my earlier papers (Bi-
bok 1998; 2000; 2002). I used conceptual differentiation in connection
with verbs such as hív ‘call’, küld ‘send’, vág ‘cut’ etc. combining it with
the notions of lexical stereotype and prototype. The events which can
be expressed by single lexemes (and not by some periphrastic causative
constructions) are restricted in terms of the lexical stereotypes belonging
to conceptual representations of word meanings. Lexical stereotypes pre-
scribe the corresponding—perhaps culture-dependent—manner (if any)
and goal (if any) of the events (Gergely–Bever 1986). While lexical stereo-
types of lexemes constrain their referential potential, they do not prevent
these lexemes from conceptually differentiating in context. The literal
meanings taking shape this way can refer not only to typical but also
to non-typical situations.8 These constituents of event representations
can be illustrated with an analysis of the verb cut. Its lexical stereotype
includes the standard ways in which one can cut something but excludes
such non-stereotypical methods as the following. If John fastens a knife to
7 Abstract meaning components similar to move are assumed by Jackendoff
(1990, 25–7), who applies go, be and stay appearing in semantic representa-
tions of go/change, be and keep, respectively, to various semantic fields (space,
possession, ascription of properties, scheduling of activities). Despite such a dif-
ferent range of applicability of such abstract meaning components as move or go,
one can reasonably think of one and the same conceptual interpretation domain,
namely of change from a state to another state. It is worth noting that have
occurring in the representation of lose also seems to be a meaning component
with a similar broad set of interpretations belonging to one and the same ab-
stract possession. See examples (i)–(v) taken from Bierwisch (1983a, 68):
(i) John lost his money, as he was not aware of the hole in his pocket.
(ii) John lost his money by speculating at the stock market.
(iii) John lost his friend in the overcrowded subway station.
(iv) John lost his friend in a tragic car accident.
(v) John lost his friend, as he could never suppress bad jokes about him.
As for move, below (3.3) it will appear in a more generalized form in another
respect: it can mean a change of not only physical place but also of physical
position (for this, see Wierzbicka 1996, 82–3).
8 For prototype semantics dealing with the typicality of category members, see
Kiefer (1995).
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the surface of a table then puts bread on the edge of the knife and a heavy
stone on the bread causing it to be divided into two parts, one can hardly
call this event cutting. Instead one would express it with a periphrastic
construction: Doing this and this, John causes that. . . So the stereotype
of the lexeme cut does not allow the non-standard use of a typical cutting
instrument. However, it does not exclude the conceptual differentiation
of cut in contexts. Furthermore, these literal meanings can refer to typi-
cal and non-typical cutting events. In the latter case the agent who cuts
something may use non-typical instruments in the following three ways,
though such situations are not very likely to occur in reality:
(a) either in a way characteristic of the instrument used but uncustomary
for the object which is cut (e.g., cutting bread into two with an axe
(at one blow)),
(b) or in a way uncharacteristic of the instrument used but customary
for the object which is cut (e.g., moving the edge of an axe on bread
in a way we use a knife),9
(c) or in a way uncustomary for both the instrument used and the object
which is cut but as a result of a causative event, i.e., a not-whole
physical object is coming into being like in case of the typical cutting
and in cases (a) and (b) of the non-typical cutting (e.g., cutting a
bar of soap with a thread).
Before turning to the third mechanism of contextual interpretation, i.e.,
conceptual selection, operating on utterance (1), it is reasonable to dis-
cuss, at least briefly, the problem of legitimation of distinction between
conceptual shift and differentiation. Why should we assume two different
interpretation mechanisms if in both cases a variable is specified to get
literal meanings? Well, in case of iskola ‘school’, the variable x in (2) is
specified, and in case of elmegy ‘leave’ a predicate variable is specified.
However, these variables play different roles in lexical-semantic repre-
sentations of the words in question (cf. Bierwisch 1983a). While in an
utterance (in terms of logic) an argument is substituted for x bound by
lambda-operator in (2), the predicate variable in the representation of
elmegy ‘leave’ cannot be concretized by a constituent in an argument po-
sition, and therefore it is to be bound by an existential quantifier. That
9 A flat shingle is not an instrument and, consequently, it is not inherently assigned
any goals. Nonetheless, it can occasionally be used to cut something in a way we
cut with a knife. This cutting event could also be included in type (b).
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is why one has to assume two mechanisms, namely conceptual shift and
differentiation, according to the types of interpretation.
After introducing conceptual shift and differentiation in some detail,
we can simply show the way in which the parts of the utterance mean-
ing are co-ordinated in order to form an acceptable interpretation. Let
us turn to example (1) again. In the context of the time adverbial in
(1a), iskola ‘school’ most likely refers to an institution, and, accordingly,
the verb elmegy ‘leave’ is interpreted as a change in affiliation. In (1b),
iskola ‘school’ typically refers to a building and the verb elmegy ‘leave’
is interpreted as a change of place. Thus, depending on time-adverbial
phrases, the literal meanings of iskola and elmegy in (1a–b), respectively,
are co-ordinated. To put it differently, in utterance (1) the combination of
literal meanings of iskola ‘school’ and elmegy ‘leave’ produced by concep-
tual shift and differentiation is regulated by the third above-mentioned
operation of contextual interpretation, namely conceptual selection.
3. GLT and lexical pragmatics
Considering the lexicon not to be a sense enumerative component of the
theory of language, Pustejovsky (1995; 1998) proposes a model in which
words have a richer form of representation than they traditionally do
but can also be underspecified in some respects. Furthermore, words
are put together into complex linguistic units by means of composition
rules which are more flexible than the earlier ones. Although Pustejovsky
(1995, 232–6) does not make a distinction between linguistic and world
knowledge, it is clear from his conception that GLT can contribute to lex-
ical pragmatics in such a way as TCS does. Namely, GLT also assumes
lexically encoded but underspecified meanings and meaning construction
devices for larger units. However, at a closer look they are specific rep-
resentation forms and particular generative operations of GLT. That is
the reason why in the next subsection I will briefly introduce them and
try to find their similarities with TCS and ways in which GLT and TCS
complement each other.
3.1. The lexical representation and generative operations in GLT
Let us begin with the characterization of lexical entries. First, they
involve the following four levels of representation: argument structure,
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event structure, qualia structure and lexical inheritance structure. The
qualia structure is at the core of the generative properties of the lexicon.
It consists of four generative factors capturing how humans understand
objects and relations in the world and inspired ultimately by Aristotelian
aitia:
(a)(3) formal: the basic category that distinguishes an object within a larger
domain,
(b) constitutive: the relation between an object and its constituent parts,
(c) telic: the object’s purpose and function,
(d) agentive: factors involved in the object’s origin or “coming into being”.
Second, GLT treats polysemic words as complex types, i.e., their mean-
ings are drawn into complex types in order to grasp relations between
them. The structure assumed for each set of meanings is a Cartesian type
product. The product τ1 · τ2, or τ1.τ2, of types τ1 and τ2, each denoting
sets, is the ordered pair 〈t1, t2〉, where t1 ∈ τ1, t2 ∈ τ2.
10 Furthermore,
the semantics of complex types involves the relation R between elements
of τ1 and τ2.
Now let us take an example.
(a)(4) Mary doesn’t believe the book.
(b) Peter put the book on the shelf.
The noun book denotes in two ways: in (4a) it refers to an information
structure, and in (4b) to a physical object. One has to construct the
corresponding complex type in order to treat these different meanings as
a single type. If x equals information and y a physical object, then the
complex (dot) type can be construed as x.y. The relation between the
two meanings is that of “containment”, i.e., hold (y, x), encoded as the
formal quale value. Considering all these details and also the purpose
and origin of a book, the noun book and its Hungarian equivalent könyv
have the representation (5), where e is an event variable:
10 However, while in general the Cartesian product is not commutative, Puste-
jovsky’s dot operator cannot be commutative at all (Pustejovsky 1998, 298).
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(5)


book/könyv
argstr =
[
arg1 = x: information
arg2 = y: phys_obj
]
qualia =

 formal = hold (y, x)telic = read (e,w, x.y)
agent = write (e’, v, x.y)




We should realize that the complex type x.y occurs in the positions of
arguments of predicates read and write. This is necessary in order to ex-
press the property of these predicates which the verbs believe and put in
(4) do not have. Namely, the arguments of read and write refer to objects
which are both physical object and information structure. Thus, Puste-
jovsky rejects the earlier representation book/könyv in which arguments
of read and write belong to the simple type x.11
If in (5) the complex type x.y figures with the predicates read and
write, this has the consequence that book/könyv has to have a third mean-
ing in which the meanings ‘physical object’ and ‘information structure’
occur together. This complex meaning also appears in the case when
there is no context which unambiguously indicates either ‘physical ob-
ject’ or ‘information structure’, for instance, in (6):
(6) Mary likes the book.
The verb like itself does not require either of the above-mentioned mean-
ings of book. Instead, one can think of “bookness” with respect to (6)
and not of a specific aspect of the book.
In order that a single lexical representation of book/könyv indicate
all of the three meanings, Pustejovsky introduces the notion of lexical
conceptual paradigm (for short: lcp). It contains not only variables x
and y, but also the complex type x.y:
(7) information.phys_obj_lcp = {information.phys_obj, information, phys_obj}
Thus, one gets the following representation of book/könyv if (7) is built
into (5) (cf. Pustejovsky 1995, 101, 116, 256, note 3):
11 Interestingly, the representation of book without the complex type is not rejected
in one place of Pustejovsky’s book (1995, 204).
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(8)


book/könyv
argstr =
[
arg1 = x: information
arg2 = y: phys_obj
]
qualia =


information.phys_obj_lcp
formal = hold (y, x)
telic = read (e, w, x.y)
agent = write (e’, v, x.y)




However, the representation of other polysemic words may differ from
that of book/könyv in the sense that the complex type does not occur
in the characterization of any qualia. Since the word sonata denotes
an event (the process of performance) and an information structure of a
piece of music, Pustejovsky (1995, 174) proposes (9):
(9)


sonata
argstr =
[
arg1 = x: music
]
eventstr =
[
E1 = e1: process
]
qualia =


music.process_lcp
formal = perform (e1, w, x)
telic = listen (e’, z, e1)
agent = compose (e’’, y, x)




The qualia structure of (9) only has the constituent elements of complex
type music.process and the relation between them is expressed by means
of the predicate perform with the category formal.
It is worth looking at the representation of the word newspaper, which
has a more complex type. This noun refers not only to an information
structure and a physical object but also to an organization (institution).
Therefore, the representation of newspaper is the following (Pustejovsky
1995, 156):
(10)


newspaper
argstr =
[
arg1 = x: organization
arg2 = y: information.phys_obj
]
qualia =


organization.information.phys_obj_lcp
formal = y
telic = read (e, w, y)
agent = publish (e’, x, y)




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Although it is not explicit in (10), Pustejovsky remarks that newspaper
cannot denote the entire complex type, i.e., it can have no reference to
types both organization and information.phys_obj at the same time.
Now let us turn to type coercion and co-composition by means of
which meanings of complex expressions, i.e., contextual meanings are
construed in GLT.12 Consider (11):
(a)(11) Mária elkezdte/folytatta/befejezte a könyvet.
Mária.nom began/continued/finished.def.3sg the book.acc
‘Mária began/continued/finished the book.’
(b) Mária elkezdte/folytatta/befejezte a könyv olvasását.
Mária.nom began/continued/finished.def.3sg the book.nom reading.poss.acc
‘Mária began/continued/finished reading the book.’
(c) Mária elkezdte olvasni a könyvet.
Mária.nom began.def.3sg to.read the book.acc
‘Mária began to read the book.’
According to GLT, the semantic relation between the occurrences of verbs
elkezd ‘begin’, folytat ‘continue’ and befejez ‘finish’ in (11a) and (11b–
c) is expressed by means of type coercion. This rule provides for the
direct object argument of verbs at stake to belong to the semantic type
of events, independently of the form of its grammatical realization (cf.
Pustejovsky 1995; 1998). Furthermore, the relevant event, necessary for
the semantic well-formedness of (11a), is encoded in the lexical-semantic
representation of the noun könyv ‘book’. The representation of book/
könyv we saw in (8) suggests that the purpose of a book (the telic
role) is to read it. If one takes this piece of information into account, it
is guaranteed that, according to type coercion, the verbs elkezd ‘begin’,
folytat ‘continue’ and befejez ‘finish’ are connected with an event in (11a),
where—unlike (11b–c)—the predicates olvasás/olvas ‘reading/read’ are
not lexically expressed. However, the agentive role provides a further
meaning: (11a) might mean not only (11b–c) but also that Mária began/
continued/finished writing (or to write) the book. So, in (11a) there can
be another implicit predicate because of another quale role of book/könyv.
Two additional remarks seem to be in order with respect to (11a).
First, since the lexical-semantic representation of book/könyv gives two
ways of construing the meaning of (11a), its disambiguation needs some
12 In GLT there is a third mechanism, i.e., selective binding, which is not dealt with
in this paper (for a discussion of it, see Pustejovsky 1995, 127–31).
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contextual support. To put it differently: in order to interpret an ut-
terance such as (11a), one needs some pieces of contextual information.
Only in this case can one choose either the predicate read or the predicate
write from the two lexically given possibilities, offered by the representa-
tion of book/könyv. Second, like the interpretations of (1), the meanings
of (11a) constructed on the basis of (8) are only typical, or default, read-
ings (Pustejovsky 1998, 304), because they can be overridden in a wider
context. Below I have to return to this question several times.
To see how the other mechanism of GLT, i.e., co-composition, works,
let us consider (12):
(a)(12) Az üveg/Péter a folyóban úszik.
the bottle/Péter.nom the river.ine floats/swims.indef
‘The bottle/Péter is floating/swimming in the river.’
(b) Az üveg/Péter a barlangba úszik.
the bottle/Péter.nom the cave.ill floats/swims.indef
‘The bottle/Péter is floating/swimming into the cave.’
Relying on Pustejovsky (1995, 125–6), one may explain the systematic
polysemy exhibited by (12) in the following way. The verb úszik ‘float/
swim’ has only one meaning in the lexicon, which expresses the process
and manner of motion (see (12a)). The meaning ‘to move in some di-
rection in some manner’ appearing in (12b) does not belong to the verb
úszik ‘float/swim’ itself, but to the phrase consisting of this verb and the
inflexional noun. This second, more complex meaning, associated not
with a direction inherent in any motion but with a transition from an
initial point to an end, cannot be derived from the constituent parts, i.e.,
the verb and inflected noun, by means of a simple rule of composition.
One has to assume that the inflected noun also behaves like a functor
(predicate) in respect to úszik ‘float/swim’. Consequently, the mean-
ing of the phrase a barlangba úszik ‘is floating/swimming into the cave’
is constructed by the operation which allows for several constituents to
be considered functors in a simple construction and which, therefore, is
called co-composition in GLT (see also Pustejovsky 1995, 122–5; Puste-
jovsky 1991, 62–4).
In the remaining part of this section, through comparing GLT with
TCS, I show my proposals modifying GLT’s conception of lexical-semantic
representation and generative procedures.
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 51, 2004
280 károly bibok
3.2. Proposals concerning lexical-semantic representation
Meaning representations in the lexicon are underspecified both in TCS and
in GLT. However, this character of representation has different sources.
In case of the definition ‘x has the goal to provide for teaching/learning
processes’ in (2), it derives from the presence of variable x, and in case
of the verb elmegy ‘leave’ from the abstract component move. At the
same time, in representations (8)–(10) it originates from the content of
the lexical conceptual paradigm, which contains more than one meaning.
Like the alternation of primary literal meanings of iskola ‘school’, i.e.,
‘institution’ and ‘building’, no single basic meaning is highlighted in the
lcp. Without finishing the enumeration of arguments for the conceptions
of either TCS or GLT, I indicate two features characteristic of representa-
tions in GLT but not in TCS. First, the complex type and lcp guarantee
expressing the joint appearance of some meanings, i.e., the reference of
a polysemic word to the complex type. However, it is not always clear
on the basis of lexical-semantic representations when this is possible and
when it is not (see the complex type organization.information.phys_obj
in (10)). Second, the category formal in the qualia structure encodes
the relationship between the simple types which form the complex one
(see also the quale agentive of newspaper: publish (e’, x: organization,
y: information.phys_obj)).
However, a problem emerges in connection with (8)–(10): How can
GLT treat the other, non-metaphorical meanings of book/könyv, sonata,
newspaper. Let us take book/könyv again and recall the distinction be-
tween primary and non-primary literal meanings as well. Then one can
state that the primary literal meanings of book/könyv, i.e., ‘information
structure’ and ‘physical object’, established in Bibok (1999), coincide
with the meanings captured also by Pustejovsky’s analysis. As for the
non-primary literal meanings that can be attached to primary ones, con-
sider (13):13
(a)(13) Peter is weary of the book.
(b) One of the sources of knowledge remains the book.
13 In what follows I discuss English equivalents of the original Hungarian exam-
ples with book -type nouns because these languages do not differ in polysemic
structures under analysis.
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In (13a) the noun book can be interpreted as an activity concerning the
book and in (13b) as not a simple information structure but a type of
that. If one claims that the predicate be weary of has the argument
from the set of events, the meaning ‘activity’ can be provided through
the categories telic and agentive in the qualia structure of book/könyv.
How do we give an account of the meaning ‘type of information structure’
in the framework of GLT? Before answering this question, let us turn to
sonata and newspaper again. The noun sonata was analysed as one that
belongs to book -type nouns (Bibok 1999) because the meanings of book/
könyv are also characteristic of it. However, these meanings have to be
complemented with others:
(a)(14) The pianist is weary of the sonata.
(b) The culmination of the concert was the sonata.
(c) Yesterday I borrowed the sonata from the audio library.
In (14a) the noun sonata is interpreted as an activity but in the first
place, perhaps, not as a functional or creative activity (cf. the predicates
listen and compose in (9)), but rather as practising and rehearsing, in
general, as playing a piece of music. In (14b) one can think of a particular
part of this activity, namely of a given performance, publishable later, for
example, on cassette (= physical object2) (cf. (14c)).
As to the noun newspaper, it has an even more complicated polysemic
structure:
(a)(15) In 1975 Peter left the newspaper.
(b) The newspaper took part in the demonstration.
As (15a) and (15b) show, beside the meanings characteristic of book/
könyv, the noun newspaper can be used with the meanings ‘institu-
tion’ (‘organization’) and ‘ensemble of people’, customary for school -type
nouns. In the representation of newspaper in (10), however, it is only re-
ferred to the former.
Moreover, in an example such as (16) below, the activity which Peter
is weary of can be connected to the physical object, information structure,
complex type information.phys_obj or institution:
(16) Peter is weary of the newspaper.
In order to treat all the above-mentioned meanings of book, sonata and
newspaper in the framework of GLT, more complex types have to be in-
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troduced into their lexical conceptual paradigm. Of course, there is no
principled reason not to do so, provided that the relationship between
meanings is expressed. It is true that for newspaper one can assume a
lexical conceptual paradigm somewhat different from that in (10) (Puste-
jovsky 1995, 155). It includes the type printed_matter, posited on the
same level in the type hierarchy as organization and conceived as a type
which equals the complex type consisting of the simple types informa-
tion and physical_object:
(17) newspaper_lcp = {printed_matter.organization, printed_matter, organization}
Because of the necessary distinction between primary and non-primary
literal meanings, however, this solution cannot be extended to all of the
above-mentioned meanings of words book, sonata and newspaper. Pri-
mary meanings relate to non-primary ones in another way than complex
types and their (ultimately simple) constituents do. Non-primary mean-
ings are produced by means of attaching some meaning components to
primary meanings (Bibok 1999; 2000). In the case of school -type nouns,
the component ‘ensemble of people’ has to be attached to ‘institution’
and ‘building’ or, in GLT, to the lexical conceptual paradigm institu-
tion.building_lcp. In the case of book -type nouns, the component ‘activ-
ity’ has to be tied to ‘information structure’ and ‘physical object’ or, in
GLT, to the lexical conceptual paradigm information.phys_obj_lcp. In
addition, another non-primary meaning is derived from a non-primary
one in the same way: ‘activity’ is attached to ‘ensemble of people’ (in
case of school -type nouns), then ‘element of activity’ to ‘activity’ (in case
of some school - and book -type nouns, see, e.g., sonata), and then ‘physi-
cal object2’ to ‘element of activity’ (in case of some book -type nouns, see
again sonata). Hence, from the previous discussion we have to conclude
that the polysemy at issue cannot be treated via the postulation of more
complex types. Without finishing the comparison of the conceptions of
meaning representation in GLT and TCS, I can state that (8)–(10) should
be completed anyway in order to reach more full-fledged representations
of the polysemy characteristic of book/könyv, sonata, newspaper and in
general of book - and school -type nouns.
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3.3. Proposals concerning generative devices
In this subsection I examine unavoidable modifications of type coercion
and co-composition.14 Let us first consider (18), in which, unlike in (11),
the subject position is filled in with common nouns such as író ‘author’
and fordító ‘translator’ and not with proper names.
(a)(18) Az író elkezdte/folytatta/befejezte a könyvet.
the author.nom began/continued/finished.def.3sg the book.acc
‘The author began/continued/finished the book.’
(b) A fordító elkezdte/folytatta/befejezte a könyvet.
the translator.nom began/continued/finished.def.3sg the book.acc
‘The translator began/continued/finished the book.’
How does the change of words in subject position effect the interpretation
of (18a) and (18b)? In the former the noun in the subject position con-
firms one of the lexical possibilities, encoded in the quale agentive of
book/könyv: ‘The author began/continued/finished writing the book.’ In
the latter utterance, however, the noun fordító ‘translator’ overrides the
information in both the telic and agentive roles of book/könyv. Thus,
we get the following interpretation: ‘The translator began/continued/
finished translating the book.’ It is worth noting that these interpreta-
tions seem to be only default (typical) ones because a wider context may
change them.
Consequently, the event necessary for the construction of utterance
meaning can be provided not only by the categories telic or agentive,
but also the words in subject position may have an effect on utterance
meaning. Without any further contextual specificity, they confirm either
the events guaranteed by the lexical-semantic representation of words in
object position, or they override the information accessible on the basis
of the lexicon. In some cases, however, it is obligatory to get over the
object argument of the verbs elkezd ‘begin’, folytat ‘continue’ and befejez
‘finish’ in order to reach an appropriate utterance meaning. Although the
function of the car is to drive it (Pustejovsky 1995, 113), the phrase begin
a car does not mean ‘begin to drive a car’ (Fodor–Lepore 1998, 281). Let
us take (19) to analyse this problem in more detail.
14 An earlier version of these proposals appeared in Bibok – Németh T. (2001).
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(19) Öt perccel ezelőtt a szerelő elkezdte a kocsit.
five minute.ins ago the mechanic.nom began.def.3sg the car.acc
‘Five minutes ago the mechanic began the car.’
If knowledge about the function of the car or the factors involved in the
object’s origin do not result in an adequate utterance interpretation, one
can rely on the noun featuring in the subject position of the verb elkezd
‘begin’. Let us suppose that the noun szerelő ‘mechanic’ denotes a person
whose profession is to repair cars and similar vehicles according to the
telic quale15 or to the second argument of goal component. This rep-
resentation of szerelő ‘mechanic’ helps to get the relevant interpretation
of (19): ‘Five minutes ago the mechanic began repairing the car.’
On the basis of the above, I want to stress that there is a good reason
to distinguish two things with respect to the rule of type coercion. Since
it is possible or even necessary in some cases to take into account nouns in
the subject position, the component of construction of utterance meaning
which provides for the relevant event to begin/continue/finish etc. has to
be separated from type coercion itself, which appears in connection with
the object argument of the verb elkezd ‘begin’, folytat ‘continue’, befejez
‘finish’ etc.
It is also obvious from the above discussion that—in connection with
the possibility of interpretations provided by qualia structures of nouns in
non-object position—there is another problem of type coercion: How are
the meanings expected on the basis of Pustejovsky’s proposal excluded as
incorrect? The improductivity of type coercion has different reasons, so it
can be accounted for in several ways (cf. Trón 2002, 300–6). First, there
may be a selection restriction which constrains availability of a quale of
a particular noun (see Fodor–Lepore’s remark concerning begin a car).
Second, a selection restriction can be postulated to put a constraint on
the application of a quale. For example, the verb enjoy selects the telic
quale of a noun if the event in that quale denotes perception or consuming.
Cf. enjoy the film/beer vs. *enjoy the doorknob/federal government/carpet
tack (the ill-formed phrases are Fodor–Lepore’s 1998, 281). Third, it
may be lexicalized in a verb what serves as an event, independently of
the qualia structure of the argument: e.g., want a book/bicycle ‘want to
have a book/bicycle’.16
15 Cf. representation of such a word as typist in Pustejovsky (1995, 128).
16 As one of the reviewers suggested, the fact that type coercion based on qualia
structures does not operate in the case of a particular phrase may be captured by
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After modifying the type coercion rule, I turn to a critical evaluation
of Pustejovsky’s co-composition. To begin with, let us consider further
pairs of examples illustrating some verbs that vary the same way as úszik
‘float/swim’ in (12) does:
(a)(20) Péter a járdán szalad/rohan.
Péter.nom the pavement.sup runs/rushes.indef
‘Péter is running/rushing on the pavement.’
(b) Péter a járdára szalad/rohan.
Péter.nom the pavement.sub runs/rushes.indef
‘Péter is running/rushing onto the pavement.’
(a)(21) A balerina a párja előtt forog.
the ballerina.nom the partner.poss.nom in.front.of spins.indef
‘The ballerina is spinning in front of her partner.’
(b) A balerina a párjához forog.
the ballerina.nom the partner.poss.all spins.indef
‘The ballerina is spinning to her partner.’
(a)(22) Péter a szőnyegen könyököl/guggol.
Péter.nom the carpet.sup leans.on.one’s.elbows/crouches.indef
‘Péter is leaning on his elbows/crouching on the carpet.’
(b) Péter a szőnyegre könyököl/guggol.
Péter.nom the carpet.sub leans.on.one’s.elbows/crouches.indef
‘Péter is leaning on his elbows/crouching onto the carpet.’
The examples demonstrate that the sort of polysemy at stake is char-
acteristic of utterances containing verbs whose lexical meanings have a
motion component denoting change of place (cf. (12) and (20)) or change
of position (cf. (21)), or do not have such a component at all (cf. (22)).
Considering (12) and (20)–(22) more carefully, I want to point out
that in the (b)-examples—in comparison with the (a)-examples contain-
ing local expressions—there is a change of the argument structure because
the verbs take directional arguments. Although knowledge of the change
of argument structure is sufficient from the point of view of the argumen-
tation below, one also has to make the initial argument structure clear
blocking, which, I supposed in section 2, explains the failure of alternation of ‘in-
stitution’ and ‘building’ of the nouns kormány ‘government’ and palota ‘palace’.
To be sure, the improductivity of type coercion is an issue which requires further
investigation.
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for the complete description. Let us examine it with the verbs in (12a),
(20a), (21a) and (22a). If we agree with Pustejovsky (1995, 125) in whose
opinion there is no local argument in the argument structure of float, the
verbs úszik ‘float/swim’, szalad ‘run’, rohan ‘rush’, forog ‘spin’, könyököl
‘lean on one’s elbows’ and guggol ‘crouch’ would be one-argument verbs
and, consequently, the nouns with local inflexions or postpositions would
function as adjuncts. The fact that the nouns in question can be omitted
in some utterances seems to support this idea. However, one can think
of them as arguments on the basis that localization is inherently involved
in being in motion or position in some manners. Hence, the verbs úszik
‘float/swim’, szalad ‘run’, rohan ‘rush’, forog ‘spin’, könyököl ‘lean on
one’s elbows’ and guggol ‘crouch’ are two-argument verbs, that is, local
arguments are indispensable in their argument structure. In this case the
omission of the nouns with local inflexions and postpositions in some ut-
terances can be explained as remaining implicit on the syntactic level, but
on the semantic level the number of arguments does not decrease at all.
At this point the following question arises: given that the meanings
of (b)-examples are construed by a co-composition of verbs and nouns
with local inflexions/postpositions, what constitutes the information on
the basis of which these verbs and their directional arguments can co-
occur? Offering a co-compositional amalgamation of constituents of a
construction, Pustejovsky does not deal with how verbs playing the role
of predicates semantically select their arguments and how arguments be-
having also as functors semantically select verbs. If taking directional
arguments were not an idiosyncratic property of the verbs at issue, per-
haps, one could formulate a lexical rule changing the argument structure,
like Komlósy does (1992, 352–4) in case of the verbs which originally
mean the manner of a motion. In the sense of such a solution if a verb
denotes a manner of motion or a spatial position, a directional argument
appears with it. This rule of changing the argument structure has no
general validity in the range of lexemes with relevant meaning compo-
nents. On the one hand, one also has to take into account if a directional
argument is lexically fixed (cf. heveredik ‘lie down at full length’), the
use of the rule is blocked in case of the verb denoting the corresponding
manner (heverészik ‘be lying’). On the other hand, let us consider the
statement that only a small group of verbs which denote the manner of
a motion of inanimate things that are able to move in consequence of ex-
ternal effects is suitable for expressing the proceeding motion (Komlósy
2000, 257). The point of this statement is that the group of verbs under
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discussion does not behave homogeneously. For example, the verb inog
‘wobble’ does not take any arguments referring to an end-point but the
verb pattog ‘bounce’ does. Cf.
(a)(23) Az asztal sokáig inog a fal mellett / a padlón
the table.nom for.long wobbles.indef the wall.nom by / the floor.sup
(majd felborul).
then falls.over.indef
‘The table wobbles for a long time by the wall / on the floor (then it falls
over).’
(b) *Az asztal a fal mellé / a padlóra inog.
the table.nom the wall.nom to / the floor.sub wobbles.indef
‘The table wobbles to the wall / onto the floor.’
(a)(24) A labda sokáig pattog a fal mellett / a padlón.
the ball.nom for.long bounces.indef the wall.nom by / the floor.sup
‘The ball bounces for a long time by the wall / on the floor.’
(b) A labda (az asztaltól) a fal mellé / (az asztalról)
the ball.nom the table.abl the wall.nom to / the table.del
a padlóra pattog.
the floor.sub bounces.indef
‘The ball bounces (from the table) to the wall / onto the floor.’
Even if one formulated the rule of changing the argument structure, also
handling correctly exceptions in connection with verbs of manner of mo-
tion and spatial position, it would result in a solution that ultimately
each verb in question would be represented in the lexicon twice accord-
ing to its two different argument structures. We should realize that if we
want to treat the selection from the other direction, i.e., how arguments
choose verbs, we would encounter the same difficulties.
Thus, we have come to a contradiction not only with the require-
ment of economy of lexical representation (Bierwisch 1997), but also
with one of the fundamental efforts of GLT. Recall that GLT assumes
a number of generative devices that are used to contextually construct
semantic expressions, rather than enumerating meanings in the lexicon.
Co-composition can be regarded as a device to produce the actual, con-
textually evoked senses only in case the change of argument structure
is given account of without duplicating lexical entries with two different
selectional properties.
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If, to the facts enumerated in 3.3, we add that both GLT and TCS
admit the possibility of underspecification of lexical-semantic representa-
tions, I can propose the following to avoid the problem of co-composition.
Each verb in (12), (20)–(22) and (24) has to be treated as a single lexi-
cal item. It joins the meanings appearing in both (a)- and (b)-lines but
contains all that is relevant for the directional argument structure in (b)-
examples only as an optional part of the representation. At the same
time, this modification of the generative device in question means that
both utterance meanings are derived co-compositionally. As to the part
of representations necessary to treat the examples in the (b)-lines, it can
be depicted as (25) in view of the totality of the verbs discussed:
(25) [[move x] : [fin [loc x] α [loc u]]]
The formula (25) reads as follows: x moves so that the place [loc u] to
which x moves has a relation symbolized by α, such as ‘in’, ‘on’, ‘under’,
‘behind’, ‘by’ etc., to the end of a path, which is the result of applying
the component fin to x’s place, i.e., [loc x].
In the meaning representations of verbs such as úszik ‘float/swim’,
szalad ‘run’, rohan ‘rush’, pattog ‘bounce’, forog ‘spin’, könyököl ‘lean on
one’s elbows’, guggol ‘crouch’, inog ‘wobble’, heveredik ‘lie down at full
length’ and heverészik ‘be lying’, one can use (25) in the following way:
(a) If the meaning ‘move in some direction in some manner’ is lexical-
ized (e.g., heveredik ‘lie down at full length’), the formula (25) is an
obligatory part of the representation of the verb and not optional.
Of course, the lexicalization of the other meaning under discussion
(e.g., heverészik ‘be lying’) makes (25) unnecessary.
(b) The meaning component fin is bracketed as an optional part of the
representation in case of all verbs excluding lexicalized meanings. It
becomes relevant in such contexts as the (b)-examples above.
(c) If there is not a local argument in an argument structure—as Puste-
jovsky (1995, 125) treats the verb float—, the formula [[loc x] α
[loc u]] expressing spatial location has to be put into round brack-
ets as an optional part of the representation. This formula is needed
when the meaning component fin is activated in the (b)-lines. How-
ever, if one insists that the localization is involved in being in motion
or position in some manners and, consequently, the verbs under dis-
cussion are two-argument verbs, the expression [[loc x] α [loc u]]
never appears in round brackets.
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(d) As to the formula [move x], it is quite natural that it has to be
bracketed if the verb in the (a)-line does not refer to a motion but
a state (könyököl ‘lean on one’s elbows’ and guggol ‘crouch’). In
contrast with this, if some verbs (e.g., úszik ‘float/swim’, szalad ‘run’,
rohan ‘rush’, pattog ‘bounce’, forog ‘spin’) refer to the motion in the
(a)-lines, the part [move x] of formula (25) must not be optional in
the representations of these verbs.
Thus, we have created a modified version of co-composition giving the
meaning of a phrase so that arguments change the abstract, underspec-
ified meaning representations of verbs containing some of their parts in
round brackets into concrete ones. This concretization can be done either
by the omission of meaning elements in round brackets, e.g., fin in case
of the inflected noun folyóban ‘in river’ in (12a), or by taking bracketed
components into consideration, e.g., fin in case of the inflected barlangba
‘into cave’ in (12b). This latter operation technically equals the deletion
of round brackets indicating the optionality in meaning representations.
The modified version of co-composition can also be applied to cases where
the problem concerning the change of argument structure does not oc-
cur, e.g., in (26):
(a)(26) Péter kilépett a templomból.
Péter.nom left.indef.3sg the church.ela
‘Péter left the church (= the building).’
(b) Péter kilépett az egyházból.
Péter.nom left.indef.3sg the church.ela
‘Péter left church (= the institution).’
The underdetermined representation of the verb kilép ‘leave’ is not cap-
tured by means of putting optional parts into round brackets, like in
the representations of the verbs in (12), (20)–(22) and (24). Rather, the
meaning component move figures in a very abstract meaning, as in case
of the verb elmegy ‘leave’ in (1). The component move is only con-
cretized and refers to a physical motion (change of place) and a “social
motion” (change in affiliation), depending on the directional (source) ar-
guments templomból and egyházból with lexically fixed meanings ‘church
as building’ and ‘church as institution’, respectively.
Now let us recall the examples treated as cases of conceptual selection
in section 2. For the sake of convenience I repeat them here:
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(a)(1) 1975-ben Péter elment az iskolából.
1975.ine Péter.nom left.indef.3sg the school.ela
‘In 1975 Péter left school.’
(b) Délelőtt tíz órakor Péter elment az iskolából.
morning ten o’clock.tem Péter.nom left.indef.3sg the school.ela
‘At ten o’clock in the morning Péter left the school.’
It is easy to realize that the meanings of utterances in (1) can also be
construed by means of the modified version of co-composition. One addi-
tional point that we have to add to what has been said so far is that be-
cause of the underspecified character of the noun iskola ‘school’, only fur-
ther contexts, namely the time adverbials 1975-ben ‘in 1975’ and délelőtt
tíz órakor ‘at ten o’clock in the morning’, lead to the typical readings
of (1a) and (1b).
3.4. On the relation between TCS and GLT in general
To conclude my critical assessment of GLT, I want to make some remarks
about the connection of TCS and GLT. As for lexical-semantic represen-
tation, I want to point out once more that both conceptions admit the
possibility of underspcification of lexical entries. There are differences
in regard to the manifestation of this underspecified character of rep-
resentations, but TCS itself uses several formats according to different
lexemes, cf. variables bound by lambda-operators and existential quanti-
fiers as well as optional components in round brackets. The latter form
of representation is essentially equal to the solution of GLT when sev-
eral—but not all—meanings of a word appear in a single representation.
It is worth noting that this manner of representation of polysemy was
proposed in TCS not only for verbs but also for nouns. Pethő (1998)
introduced the mechanism of conceptual focussing, details of which—be-
cause of space limitations in the present paper—I cannot go into, but I
want to mention two features of the representations of school -type nouns
where this mechanism provides a superior explanation. First, it elimi-
nates the problem concerning the interpretation difference of the mean-
ing component goal in cases of ‘institution’ and ‘building’ (Taylor 1994).
According to Pethő’s solution, only the institution has the goal to provide
for teaching/learning processes, but the goal of the building is to provide
the location for the institution. Second, in contrast with Taylor’s (1994)
and Kiefer’s (2000) analyses based on the metonymical relation between
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meanings, Pethő does not reject the assumption of TCS about the under-
specfication of lexical-semantic representations. This latter point of view
coinciding also with that of GLT can be fully accepted in the light of the
above discussion. However, I want to stress that if one takes into account
various possibilities of underspecification in the framework of TCS, Tay-
lor’s objection against the homogeneous interpretation of the meaning
component goal does not raise any problems at all. Like the abstract-
ness of move in representations of elmegy and kilép (both ‘leave’), goal
can be treated as a meaning component which is not specific in respect
to whether it concerns an institution or a building (cf. the variable x in
(2)). In addition, the above-mentioned difference of interpretations of
goal and the relation between the meanings ‘building’ and ‘institution’
can be captured via the qualia structure of GLT, similarly to the quale
formal of book/könyv, i.e., hold (y: physical object, x: information).
Now let us compare the forms of lexical-semantic representations in
TCS and GLT with each other once again. With a constraint, one can
neglect the differences in the forms of underspecification. The constraint
concerns the distinction between language knowledge and world knowl-
edge, which may be connected with various manners of representation.
Nonetheless, in the remaining part of the present paper I will ignore this
distinction since another one is relevant for the delineation of lexical prag-
matics. As has been indicated in 1, the point is how the great number
of meanings appearing in contexts are inferred from lexically encoded in-
formation. Hence, over and above the similarities it has to be stressed
how the lexical representations applied in TCS and GLT complement
each other. So, I want to sum up the discussion from this point of view.
As far as GLT is concerned, there are the following ideas which TCS
should bear in mind: the qualia structure, the meaning expressed by the
complex type, and the relationship between types forming the complex
type. As to TCS, it could direct the attention of GLT to various ways
of being underspecified and the more comprehensive handling of some
polysemic words.
In the field of proposing mechanisms yielding contextual meanings,
there is a clear desire to establish more complex ways of composition
than in its classical versions. This endeavour resulted in the elaboration
of similar devices, i.e., conceptual selection in TCS and co-composition in
GLT. At the same time, both theories propose such procedures, namely
conceptual differentiation (TCS) and type coercion (GLT), which make
the repertoire of construing utterance meaning more full-fledged. Fur-
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thermore, it is important that the modifications offered in connection
with type coercion and co-composition in 3.3 have led to the more sig-
nificant role of contexts and, consequently, to the more underspecified
character of lexical-semantic representations.
4. RT and lexical pragmatics
4.1. Decoding and inference in RT
To outline how Relevance Theory contributes to lexical pragmatics and
how it co-operates with TCS and GLT in that framework, let us start
with the following. According to RT, utterance interpretation consists
of two phases: of decoding the linguistically encoded information result-
ing in the logical form and of executing relevant inferences. These two
operations provide the assumptions intended in communication, i.e., the
mental representations considered as representations of the possible world
in question: decoding and inference yield explicatures. However, (conver-
sational) implicatures are created only by means of inferential processes.
Before considering the elements of relevance theoretical interpreta-
tion one after the other in more detail, let us turn to two principles of Rel-
evance. The Communicative Principle of Relevance says that every utter-
ance (and, ultimately, every communicative act) conveys a presumption
of its own optimal relevance (Sperber–Wilson 1995, 158). An utterance is
optimally relevant if, on the one hand, it has enough contextual effects in
order to be worth the communicative partner’s processing effort, and, on
the other hand, if it does not require the communicative partner’s unnec-
essary processing efforts. The contextual effects which we get by means of
the processing of utterances in contexts may have three types (ibid., 108–
17). Newly represented assumptions either (a) strengthen old assump-
tions, (b) eliminate contradictions existing between the old assumptions,
or (c) result in new conclusions when they inferentially combine with old
ones. Contexts are not given in advance, but the communicative partner
chooses the corresponding one during construing the utterance meaning
so that his/her expectations concerning relevance are fulfilled. Further, if
it is necessary, immediate contexts can be extended. Extended contexts
emerge in the following three ways: (a) when the interpreter takes into
consideration information originating from a not immediately preceding
utterance of discourse, (b) when he/she includes encyclopedic informa-
tion connected to concepts figuring in the utterance or already processed
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in the context, and (c) when he/she integrates information from the im-
mediately observable environment (ibid., 132–42).
Sperber and Wilson hold that communication is one of the important
manifestations of human cognition and, according to this, the require-
ment of relevance is valid for the whole of human cognition. They formu-
late the Cognitive Principle of Relevance (ibid., 260): human cognition is
geared towards the maximization of relevance. To put it differently, the
human mind not only aims at seeking and justifying relevance but also
at achieving as many contextual effects as possible for as little processing
effort as possible.17
Returning to the two phases of utterance interpretation, it has to be
stressed that the resulting logical form is always incomplete. To get a
full-fledged proposition, at least reference assignment and disambiguation
are to be executed. Even if a complete propositional form is arrived at in
this way, its enrichment is required to develop the proposition expressed
by the given utterance. Consider this example from Wilson–Sperber
(2002, 607):
(27) (Lisa drops by her neighbours, the Joneses, who have just sat down to supper.)
Alan Jones: “Do you want to join us for supper?”
Lisa: “No, thanks. I’ve eaten.”
Decoding Lisa’s second utterance (with the assumption that the verb eat
is not ambiguous) and assigning references, one can get the complete
proposition in (28):
(28) ‘At some point in a time span whose endpoint is the time of utterance, Lisa has
eaten something.’
However, (28) says less than Lisa intended to communicate with her utter-
ance. For this (28) has to be expanded according to the Communicative
Principle of Relevance:
(29) ‘Lisa has eaten supper that evening.’
In the framework of RT, (29) is called explicature (Sperber–Wilson 1995,
182), coined analogously with the commonly used term implicature of
Gricean pragmatics.
17 For a reduction of the Communicative Principle of Relevance and other (Gricean
and neo-Gricean) pragmatic principles onto the Cognitive Principle of Relevance,
see Németh T. (2004).
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Furthermore, on the basis of Lisa’s second utterance, Alan can also
infer some implicatures, again in accordance with the Communicative
Principle of Relevance. An implicit premise and an implicit conclusion,
derivable from this premise and (29), figure in (30) and (31), respectively:
(30) ‘The fact that one has already eaten supper on a given evening is a good reason
for refusing an invitation to supper that evening.’
(31) ‘Lisa is refusing supper with us because she has already had supper this evening.’
Following Grice (1978), neo-Gricean pragmatics (see, e.g., Levinson 2000)
maintains that implicatures are cancellable without giving rise to a con-
tradiction. Post-Gricean RT, however, claims that it is pragmatic infer-
ence quite generally that is defeasible. In other words, since pragmatic
inference plays a considerable role in the derivation of explicatures, el-
ements of the explicit content of utterances are also cancellable. And
since certain entailments may be implicatures, not all implicatures are
cancellable. (For details see Carston 2002, 134–52.) Here it is impor-
tant to emphasize that cancellability/defeasibility of elements of utter-
ance meaning also appears in TCS (cf. expressions most likely and typ-
ically with regard to interpretations of (1)) and in GLT (cf. typical, or
default, readings of (11a)).
Let us return to explicatures, which have two further kinds. First,
if a proposition expressed by an utterance is embedded in a description
of the speaker’s propositional attitude, a speech act description or some
other comment on the embedded proposition, it is called higher-level
explicature (Wilson–Sperber 1993, 5). Second, there are situations when
the speaker does not intend to communicate the proposition expressed by
an utterance but another representation with which it is in a relation of
resemblance. In such cases only the latter represents the speaker’s explicit
meaning. This is the case when the speaker communicates unencoded
meanings by way of loose use (Wilson–Sperber 2002). A kind of loose
use is metaphor, which I will examine now in more detail from the point
of view of RT. Song (1998) mentions the following problems concerning
previous pragmatic approaches to it:
(a) It is not entirely clear where the borderline between literal and
metaphorical interpretations is.
(b) As a consequence of (a), the statement that the literal interpreta-
tion of the whole utterance always precedes the metaphorical one is
questionable.
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(c) Processing utterances does not involve choosing one set of interpre-
tations from an exhaustive list of possible interpretations.
(d) Defectiveness of literal interpretations is not a necessary condition
of a metaphorical utterance.
(e) The notion of similarity making the metaphorical interpretation pos-
sible is not well elaborated.
RT’s approach to metaphor is superior to earlier pragmatic approaches
because it provides a more general account of the interpretation of both
metaphorical and non-metaphorical utterances without relying on the
distinction between literal and metaphorical meanings (Song 1998, cf.
also Wilson–Sperber 2002).
After the survey of roles which inference plays in finding the in-
tended information, i.e., explicatures and implicatures, it is necessary to
sketch out the types of information encoded in utterances. The nov-
elty of RT in this respect is the delineation of procedural meanings from
conceptual ones (Wilson–Sperber 1993). The former are characteristic
of linguistic expressions whose encoded meaning imposes a constraint
or instruction on the pragmatic inferential phase of utterance interpreta-
tion. Encoded procedural pieces of information constrain the propositions
expressed (through personal pronouns such as I and you), higher-level
explicatures (through discourse particles such as eh) and implicatures
(through discourse connectives such as so and after all).
The conceptual meanings are characteristic of linguistic forms whose
encoded meaning contributes concepts to the propositions expressed (most
words belonging to independent or major parts of speech; for examples,
see below) and higher-level explicatures (sentence adverbials, including
illocutionary adverbials such as seriously and frankly).18 In connection
with conceptual meaning, the most important question from the present
point of view is how RT represents concepts. Accepting the holistic view
advocated by Fodor et al. (1980), Sperber and Wilson (1995, 86–93)
consider concepts as entities that cannot be defined in terms of, or de-
composed into, more primitive components. Although in this sense the
concepts themselves are wholes, the information that may be stored in
memory at a conceptual label falls into three distinct types: logical, en-
cyclopedic and lexical. Logical information consists of a set of deductive
18 According to Wilson and Sperber (1993) discourse connectives are best analysed
not only in procedural terms but also as cases of explicit communication rather
than as cases of Gricean conventional implicatures.
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rules which apply to logical forms of which that concept is a constituent.
The rules yield outputs from which the given concept has been removed.
Hence they are called elimination rules. For example, the logical rule of
and -elimination takes as input a single conjoined premise and yields as
output one of its constituent conjuncts. Sperber and Wilson assume log-
ical information not only in the case of logical concepts proper but also
in the case of others regarded by logic as not logical (e.g., ‘know’, ‘run’
and ‘bachelor’). Thus one can easily identify the elimination rules which
express the logical properties of concepts with the meaning postulates
proposed by Fodor et al. (1980).
The second type of information stored at a certain conceptual label
is encyclopedic: it contains information about the extension and/or de-
notation of the concept, i.e., about the objects, events and/or properties
which instantiate it. This type of information can be captured in terms
of prototype theory or frame semantics.
Finally, at a conceptual label there is lexical information, which in-
cludes the phonological and syntactic properties of the natural-language
counterpart of the concept.
Each of the above-mentioned three types of information is not neces-
sary to characterize each concept, one or another of them may be lacking
for certain concepts. For example, proper names can be seen as hav-
ing no logical information, and the concept ‘and’ as lacking encyclopedic
information. And there may be concepts which are not lexicalized and
which therefore have no lexical information. Furthermore, beside lack of
logical information and having logical information which amounts to a
proper definition of the concept, Sperber and Wilson’s (1995, 92) frame-
work allows for cases providing some logical specification of the concept
without fully defining it. The latter is true, for instance, for natural kind
terms. Further, in their more recent work Sperber and Wilson (1998,
185) state that many words such as my, long etc. do not seem to encode
a full-fledged concept. So, underspecificity can be found not only at the
level of logical form but also at the level of its constituents, i.e., con-
cepts. This underspecificity always induces inferential processes during
the interpretation of utterances. (Cf. also Wilson–Sperber 2002, 623.)
4.2. Possibility of word meaning decomposition in lexical pragmatics
As is evident from the above discussion, RT substantially differs from
TCS and GLT in respect to the representation of concepts and, conse-
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quently, to meanings of words expressing them. According to RT, con-
cepts providing the meaning for non-procedural words are not decompos-
able, that is to say, they are whole units in this sense. At the same time,
according to TCS and GLT, word meanings have internal structure, i.e.,
they are composed out of more primitive meaning components. In this
subsection I will argue that decomposition is more suitable than the holis-
tic view. To begin with, let us consider (32) and (33), which include the
decomposed meaning representations, in traditional format, for the verbs
kill and give, as well as (34) and (35), which show meaning postulates
assigned to the same two verbs by a holistic view (cf. Jackendoff 1990, 39).
(32) cause (x, become (y, not alive (y)))
(33) cause (x, have (y, z))
(34) x killed y → y died
(35) x gave z to y → y had/has z
One can easily realize that, in contrast with the contingency of entail-
ments in (34) and (35), the events expressed by means of die and have
obviously result from the internal structure of (32) and (33). Surely
the meaning of die can be represented as become (y, not alive (y))
and that of have as have (y, z). The meaning representations (32) and
(33) indicate not only the relation between kill and die as well as give
and have but also the possibility of generalizing between the members of
causative–noncausative pairs. The following schema, where e = event,
can be proposed:
(36) x causes e to occur → e occurs
In other words, the schema in (36) established through decomposition of
verb meanings brings into connection the otherwise unrelated meaning
postulates in (34) and (35). A conclusion can be drawn that the meaning
postulate approach misses all generalizations across relational properties
of lexical items (cf. Jackendoff 1990, 39).
Let us examine the two different meaning representations from an-
other point of view. Now I start from the underspecific character of word
meanings in terms of RT that words such as my and long encode no
full-fledged concepts. Unlike Fodor et al. (1980), in this case one can-
not expect that the meaning decomposition gives the necessary and at
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the same time sufficient conditions of application of words. Although
this statement weakens the criticism against decomposition, it is worth
raising the question: how would RT or the meaning postulate approach
handle polysemy if we wanted to apply an underspecified representation
to capture the relation between various meanings rather than enumer-
ating these meanings? Using the notion of complex type, in the case of
book we could write the following entailment:
(37) x.y is a book → information.phys_obj_lcp
As has been argued in 3.2, the noun book also has other meanings, which
can be expressed in terms of meaning postulates via (38) and (39):
(38) x.y is a book → x.y is an activity
(39) y is a book → y is a type of information
Do (38) and (39) give account of the meanings ‘activity’ and ‘type of in-
formation’, respectively? Yes, of the meanings themselves. However, they
do not express that these meanings are connected to those represented
in (37). Furthermore, on the basis of (38) and (39) it is not clear that
the meanings are generally characteristic of the book -type nouns, i.e., the
words with ‘information’, ‘physical object’ and the complex type consist-
ing of the former simple types.
The meaning postulate approach does not seem to be successful in
capturing the information represented in (25) in subsection 3.3, either.
Let us recall that each of the verbs in (12), (20)–(22) and (24) can be
handled as a single lexical entry if the meanings in (a)- and (b)-examples
are represented as one abstract meaning with optional parts (e.g., fin),
which are only relevant in the second context. In the opposite case the
meaning postulates like the ones below would be needed:
(40) x úszik ‘float/swim’ / szalad ‘run’ / rohan ‘rush’ / pattog ‘bounce’ / forog ‘spin’
/ könyököl ‘lean on one’s elbows’ / guggol ‘crouch’ → x moves in some place
(41) x úszik ‘swim/float’ / szalad ‘run’ / rohan ‘rush’ / pattog ‘bounce’ / forog ‘spin’
/ könyököl ‘lean on one’s elbows’ / guggol ‘crouch’ → x moves to some place
However, (40) and (41) do not indicate the semantic relation between the
members of verb pairs at all. If one tried to express the relation between
‘to some place’ and ‘in some place’ in terms of meaning postulates, the
probable schema would tell no more than what clearly follows from the
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 51, 2004
word meaning and lexical pragmatics 299
corresponding formula composed out of meaning components, i.e., [(fin)
[loc x] α [loc u]].19
As has been claimed above, meaning decomposition is not a method
that guarantees the necessary and, at the same time, sufficient conditions
of application of words. Consequently, it cannot been considered the only
way of the meaning representation. Instead, prototype theory, which
was mentioned in connection with the conceptual differentiation of TCS
and the encyclopedic information stored at conceptual addresses in RT,
plays a significant role, as well. Surely, independently of whether words
encode full-fledged concepts, prototype semantics provides characteristics
of a heuristic, mainly perceptual and functional kind which structurally
determine cognitive processes such as picking out instances of concepts.
This way we arrive at a conception of meaning representation according
to which the meaning structure of lexemes is not uniform but consists
of constituents accessible by means of various methods of analysis. In
addition, different words include various constituents to a different degree.
Besides, we have to take into account that logical words (and, or, not,
all etc.) and lexical items with procedural meaning are to be handled
in different ways, i.e., not in terms of semantic decomposition and/or
prototype theory.20
4.3. Immediate and extended contexts in lexical pragmatics
The role of contexts in utterance interpretation in the view of lexical
pragmatics amounts to much more than choosing a meaning from a set
fixed in an underspecified representation. Before dealing with the de-
tails of this issue, I want to point out that, following Bibok–Németh T.
(2001), by immediate context I mean the remaining part of the utterance
under investigation in the subsequent sections of the present paper. Such
a treatment of the immediate context seems to be in order not only in
absence of an utterance immediately preceding the utterance under in-
vestigation but also because certain constituents of the utterance, a word
19 In contrast to Fodor et al. (1980), psycholinguistic investigations by Gergely and
Bever (1986) show that relatedness intuitions cannot be used as a critical test of
the relative complexity of syntactic and semantic representations of predicates.
For further arguments against the meaning postulate approach, see Bierwisch
(1997, 232–3); Jackendoff (1990, 40–1).
20 For a typology of words based on the various kinds of representation of their
meaning, see Bibok (2000).
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of which one wants to understand, can serve as a context to get its prag-
matically enriched meaning. In addition, since the conceptual meaning of
words is represented in terms of decomposition and/or prototype theory,
semantic information from these internal structures, including encyclope-
dic information provided by prototype, is directly given in the immediate
context. Below I will show that the immediate context, understood in
this way, plays a crucial role in lexical pragmatics, unlike in RT but in
accordance with TCS and GLT.
As for extended context, it refers to extending the immediate context,
defined as above. Lexical pragmatics regards as an extended context an
utterance immediately preceding the utterance under investigation, un-
like RT, which only takes an utterance occurring earlier in the exchange
as a case of extending contexts. This divergence from RT does not cre-
ate a conceptual problem because RT itself allows for multiple extending
of contexts. Further, according to lexical pragmatics, contexts can be
extended by the help of information from the immediately observable
environment (as in RT) and through encyclopedic information, not cap-
tured in prototype structures, e.g., world knowledge about denotations
of proper names, which appear both in immediate contexts and previous
utterances.
As has been said in connection with (18b), the noun fordító ‘trans-
lator’ overrides the information in both the telic and agentive roles of
book/könyv. In terms of RT it can be made explicit as follows: if in the
position of syntactic subject of an utterance there is a noun which refers
to a person’s profession, the hearer may infer another event connected to
book/könyv. On the basis of this immediate context—for lack of further
contextual specificity—he/she gets the following relevant interpretation:
‘The translator began/continued/finished translating the book.’ Con-
trary to a default utterance such as Mária elkezdte/folytatta/befejezte a
könyvet ‘Mária began/continued/finished the book’ (= 11a), the inter-
pretation of an utterance with the noun fordító ‘translator’ (= 18b) needs
more cognitive effort, which, in turn, is recovered with the more specific
contextual effects yielded by the processing (18b).
In a case when neither the noun in the position of syntactic object
nor the immediate context, i.e., the noun in the position of syntactic
subject, result in a relevant interpretation, the hearer has to apply context
extension to it. Let us consider (42):
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(42) Péter elkezdte/folytatta/befejezte a könyvet.
Péter.nom began/continued/finished.def.3sg the book.acc
‘Péter began/continued/finished the book.’
The noun itself occurring in the syntactic subject position of (42) does
not provide enough information for a relevant interpretation. However,
if one extends the context by means of the encyclopedic information con-
cerning the Péter’s profession, one may get the relevant interpretation.
For example, if it is known that Péter is a translator by profession, (42)
probably means that he began/continued/finished to translate the book.
Furthermore, according to RT, contexts can also be extended by means
of the discourse context or immediately observable physical environment.
So, if the relevant “world” is constructed in the context of a discourse or
we can see a little boy who has torn up a book, (42) can refer to an event
such as Péter began/continued/finished to tear the book to pieces.
To sum up, as to how to interpret the verbs elkezd ‘begin’, folytat
‘continue’, befejez ‘finish’, I can generally state the following. With these
and similar verbs, the lexically unrealized (implicit) predicate is iden-
tified in three ways: (a) if lexical-semantic representations of nouns in
syntactic object position provide the events for relevant interpretation; if
(b) the rest of the utterance or (c) an extended context give grounds for
a pragmatically acceptable assumption.
The same interpretation mechanisms are suitable for implicit argu-
ments (Németh T. 2001). For example, the unrealized object of the verb
eszik ‘eat’ can be identified not only in the way illustrated in connec-
tion with (27), i.e., by means of extending the context but also via the
lexical-semantic representation of that verb or its immediate context.
Let us assume that, independently of the lexical realization, the verb
eszik ‘eat’ always has two arguments on the semantic level because the
activity denoted by that verb is logically inconceivable without a second
argument. Furthermore, its lexical-semantic representation contains a se-
lectional restriction put on the second argument: it has to be of the type
food. Consider (43) answering the question Mit csinál Péter? ‘What is
Péter doing?’
(43) Péter eszik.
Péter.nom eats.indef
‘Péter is eating.’
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A hearer can try to interpret (43) without any specific context. In decod-
ing the verb eszik ‘eat’, he/she arrives at more specific information than
‘eat something’, figuring in logical form (28) (cf. Wilson–Sperber 2002).
It is enough for him/her to rely on the selectional restriction of that verb
to get a relevant interpretation: ‘Péter is eating something that can be
eaten (i.e., food).’
Now consider (44) answering the question Mit csinál a felesége?
‘What is his wife doing?’
(44) A felesége fogta a tányért és a kanalat, és eszik.
the wife.poss.nom took.def.3sg the bowl.acc and the spoon.acc and eats.indef
‘His wife took the bowl and spoon and is eating.’
Let us try to interpret (44) without any specific context, external to that
utterance. In (44) the lexical-semantic representation of the verb eszik
‘eat’ including the appropriate selection restriction alone does not yield
a relevant interpretation. We have to take into account the rest of the
utterance, i.e., the immediate context to identify the lexically unexpressed
direct object argument. The encyclopedic information stored with lexical
items of the utterance makes accessible an assumption like the following:
Adult people typically eat liquid food, e.g., soup or a vegetable stew,
out of a bowl and with a spoon. Naturally, a little child may eat other
food with a spoon, but this reading cannot come into one’s mind without
specific indication because, according to our encyclopedic knowledge, the
lexeme feleség ‘wife’ typically denotes an adult human being. Hence the
relevant interpretation of (44) may be that ‘his wife took the bowl and
spoon and she is eating soup, a vegetable stew or something similar out
of the bowl with a spoon’.
Utterance meanings yielded through co-composition or conceptual
selection can also be derived by means of the three interpretation mecha-
nisms shown in cases of implicit predicates and arguments. First, under-
specified predicates are influenced by lexically encoded meanings of ar-
guments: the verbs úszik ‘float/swim’, szalad ‘run’, rohan ‘rush’, pattog
‘bounce’, forog ‘spin’, könyököl ‘lean on one’s elbows’ and guggol ‘crouch’
by nouns with local or directional inflexions and postpositions (cf. (12),
(20)–(22), (24)) as well as the verb kilép ‘leave’ by the nouns egyház
‘church = institution’ or templom ‘church = building’ (cf. (26)). Second,
immediate contexts provide the relevant information to infer meanings of
verb phrases. For example: the time adverbials 1975-ben ‘in 1975’ and
délelőtt tíz órakor ‘at ten o’clock in the morning’ in (1). Third, extended
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contexts make accessible inferences which lead to pragmatically accept-
able assumptions. This is the case with utterances whose interpretation
is not supported by time adverbials:
(45) Péter elment az iskolából.
Péter.nom left.indef.3sg the school.ela
‘Péter left school.’
Co-composition and conceptual selection can be conceived of as inter-
pretation mechanisms which do not only give the meanings of linguistic
constructions (via amalgamation plus inference) but also help to infer
meanings of their constituents (of which, then, meanings of constructions
are composed). Let us take the first case. Meanings of underspecified
predicates in utterances can be concretized on the basis of information
encoded linguistically in contexts. This proceeds similarly to the disam-
biguation of lexically and grammatically ambiguous expressions through
inferential processes in RT. Nonetheless, there is a substantial difference.
With our examples we choose either of the meanings not from a list of
meanings but from underspecified lexical-semantic representations (‘move
in some manner’ and ‘move in some manner to somewhere’) as well as
from meanings accessible on the conceptual level (‘physical motion’ and
‘change in social status’). As to the above-mentioned second and third
cases, meanings of the constituents elmegy ’leave’ and iskola ‘school’ of
a phrase in (45) are inferred on the basis of extended contexts which
supply world knowledge. Even if such time adverbials as 1975-ben ‘in
1975’ or délelőtt tíz órakor ‘at ten o’clock in the morning’ appear in an
utterance (cf., e.g., (1a) or (1b)), there is no doubt that they specify the
meanings of iskola ‘school’ and—by virtue of that specification—those
of elmegy ‘leave’ inferentially but not by means of linguistic information
encoded by themselves.
4.4. Interpretation mechanisms and relevance
In Bibok–Németh T. (2001) it is argued that a single general rational
principle, the Cognitive Principle of Relevance, discussed in 4.1, regu-
lates the three ways in which one construes the meaning of utterances
with implicit arguments and predicates as well as the utterance meaning
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emerging through co-composition or conceptual selection.21 Furthermore,
the hierarchy of three interpretation mechanisms is regulated by the same
principle, too (Bibok–Németh T. 2001). To avoid unnecessary processing
efforts resulting in no suitable contextual effects, the adequate interpre-
tation can be formed—for lack of any specific context—by the help of
a lexical-semantic representation of the lexemes in question. If this does
not lead to a relevant interpretation, then, for lack of any specific context
outside the utterance under procedure, the immediate context should be
taken into consideration. If this does not yield the pragmatically ac-
ceptable interpretation either, one should extend the context, making
more processing efforts. In other words, the interpretation proceeds from
less to more processing effort, i.e., from taking into consideration lexical-
semantic representations to extending contexts. The interaction between
lexical-semantic information and context of sufficient quantity indicates
the functioning of the Cognitive Principle of Relevance.
In view of the hierarchy of interpretation procedures, it has to be
stressed once more that, in the proposal I have just outlined, the indi-
cation of lack of special contexts plays a crucial role in the functioning
of gradual interpretation. If the context is more specific from the be-
ginning, it determines the utterance meaning to a higher degree. At the
same time, this claim does not contradict what has been said in connec-
tion with TCS in section 2: because of non-neutral contexts, representing
metaphorical meanings requires the deletion or re-interpretation of previ-
ously established meaning components. If this does not necessarily hold
for processing utterances, it is true for the representations corresponding
the various kinds of meanings of linguistic expressions. Similarly, the dis-
tinction between primary and non-primary literal meanings, introduced
also in section 2, indicates the relation existing on the level of represen-
tations since it is not necessarily the case that all the primary meanings
have to be processed to derive one non-primary meaning.
5. Conclusion
In the present paper I have outlined a conception of lexical pragmatics
which critically amalgamates the views of Two-level Conceptual Seman-
tics, Generative Lexicon Theory and Relevance Theory concerning word
21 In all these cases one may think of the construction of explicit utterance meaning,
i.e., that of explicatures.
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meanings in utterances. As I have demonstrated in detail, lexical prag-
matics has more explanatory power than each theory does separately. It
has the following main theses.
Lexical pragmatics accepts—as a starting-point of the construction
of word meanings in utterances—lexical-semantic representations which
can be radically underspecified and allow for other methods of meaning
description than componential analysis. All three theories investigated
in order to elaborate on lexical pragmatics agree that a number of words
do not encode full-fledged concepts. If, according to the argumentation
in 4.2, word meanings are not treated as wholes, then, for the man-
ifestation of underspecificity, one uses the forms of representations put
forward by TCS and GLT in favour of the systematic and economical han-
dling of lexical units. Furthermore, in contextual interpretation, lexical
pragmatics applies lexical-semantic representations in which, beside de-
composition, a significant role is given to prototype semantics mentioned
in connection with both TCS and RT. Not only are meaning structures
of words non-uniform but also various methods of meaning description
are necessary for various words. For example, componential analysis and
prototype theory cannot be applied to logical words (and, or, not, all
etc.) or to words having procedural meanings such as personal pronouns,
pragmatic connectives and particles.
According to RT, the logical form yielded by decoding is to be en-
riched to get the proposition expressed by an utterance. Lexical prag-
matics is of the opinion that as words have underspecified meaning repre-
sentations, they also reach their full meanings in corresponding contexts
through considerable pragmatic inference. Likewise, the contexts may
help to find lexically required arguments and predicates which are, how-
ever, unrealized in utterances.
Inspired by RT, lexical pragmatics distinguishes between immediate
and extended contexts. However, as has been pointed out in 4.3, in lexical
pragmatics they are meant as contexts inside and outside utterances,
respectively, that words under interpretation can have.
Lexical pragmatics claims that there is a manner of utterance mean-
ing construction which operates only on the basis of lexical-semantic rep-
resentations. Hence, with respect to type coercion, co-composition and
conceptual selection, the utterance meaning can be construed in three
different ways: by means of lexical-semantic representations, immediate
and extended contexts.
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Furthermore, in the view of lexical pragmatics, the Cognitive Princi-
ple of Relevance regulates the construction of utterance meaning in one of
three ways, the hierarchy of which is also influenced by the same princi-
ple. As has been claimed in 4.4, interpretation proceeds from less to more
processing effort, i.e., from taking into consideration lexical-semantic rep-
resentations to extending contexts.
Finally, I hope that the proposed concept of lexical pragmatics will
bring more results if it is applied to further empirical data and compared
with other models of lexical pragmatics or words-in-use (Blutner 1998;
Weigand 1998). The latter task would be extremely intriguing. Criti-
cizing TCS and GLT, Blutner proposes an underspecification approach
with a mechanism of contextual enrichment based on a neo-Gricean re-
treatment of conversational implicatures. Contrary to a formalized the-
ory of lexical pragmatics, the preferred framework in Weigand (1998) is
one that deals with natural, i.e., authentic, language use and for that
the starting-point is words-in-use. However, a comprehensive compari-
son of how I conceive of lexical pragmatics with other strands is a task
for future research.
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